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The purpose of the communication subsystem for Distributed 
Interactive Simulation (DIS) is to provide an appropriate 
interconnected environment for effective integration of locally 
and globally distributed simulation entities. There are many 
diverse aspects of this integration, ranging from the nature of 
the entities represented within the common simulated environment, 
to the common communication interface used for receiving packets 
of information from other simulators. The standard addressed by 
this Rationale Document is concerned only with the necessary 
communication system standards which must be accepted and adopted 
for supporting the integrated framework. 
The Protocol Data units (PDUs) defined in the DIS Standard are 
the "lingua franca" by which any two simulators or simulation 
sites can communicate. This includes simulators of different and 
unrelated design and architecture. No restriction is placed on 
what the participating simulator or site is, only on the way it 
communicates with the outside world. 
Where the DIS PDUs define the information passed between 
simulators and simulation sites, this standard will define how 
those simulators, simulation sites, and other DIS entities can be 
connected in a modular fashion to facilitate the communication at 
the local and global levels. This will be done through the 
required use of communications standards which promote 
interoperability, such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
reference model and the Government OSI Profile (GOSIP). 
This standard describes the communication architecture subsystem 
that will support DIS exercises and activities. The DIS PDU 
standard describes the format of the application protocol data 
units that contain the entity, environment, and simulation 
management information that will be carried on the network. This 
standard describes the structure and use of the network to carry 
that information. This document describes the rational behind 
the requirements and specifications in the communication 
architecture standard. The guidance document (TBD) will describe 
how to use the information in creating a communication subsystem 
to support DIS activity. 
1.1.1 Background 
The current work on standards began in August 1989 with the First 
Workshop on Standards for the Interoperability of Defense 
Simulations. Using the work of SIMNET as a baseline and 
considering recommendations made in workshop meetings and 





















standard which describes the form and types of messages to be 
exchanged between simulated entities in a Distributed Interactive 
simulation. The workshops also provided for discussion in other 
areas associated with DIS such as environment, fidelity and 
exercise control and feedback, and communication architecture and 
security. Through the meetings of the workshops, based on 
discussions and individual input, the first draft of the 
COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE FOR DISTRIBUTED INTERACTIVE SIMULATION 
(CADIS) military standard has been developed. This rationale 
document addresses this first draft of the communication 
architecture/security standard. 
1.2 Scope 
This document contains extensive rationale supporting the choice 
of key items that have become part of the draft military standard 
entitled COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE FOR DISTRIBUTED INTERACTIVE 
SIMULATION. This rationale is intended to give the system 
designer a better understanding of why some choices were made and 
what impact deviation from them might have on the communication 
architecture system being designed. The communication 
architecture defined in the above mentioned draft military 
standard encompasses layers 1 through 5 of International 
Organization for Standardization's (ISO) Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model (ISORM). 
1.2.1 Intended use 





To define the service and performance requirements of a 
communication architecture to support DIS applications. 
To recommend standard, non-proprietary protocols to be 
used in the communication architecture which will 
support the above requirements. 
To recommend interim protocols to be used in the 
communication architecture for those requirements that 
cannot be met by existing standardized protocols. 
To present issues (interoperability, security, 
management) that are related to the communication 
architecture specified for DIS applications as they 
appear in position papers and working group 
recommendations. 
1.2.3 Future Goals 
The standard for communication architecture for DIS has been 
created to meet the program needs of those programs using or 





















is one attempt to progress to communication technology which does 
not exist today but must be developed to meet the service 
requirements. This section describes some of those 
technologies/issues which are not currently addressed in this 
standard but will need to be addressed in the future. 
1.2.3.1 Video Conferencing 
A number of DIS documents, including the concept of operations, 
have identified a video conferencing requirement. This is to 
support exercise planning, briefing, and debriefing, but specific 
requirements (e.g. number of sites, functionality) have not been 
identified. The communications industry is creating new ways to 
achieve such video conferencing, but mature products are not yet 
available. Video conferencing is very demanding of network 
capabilities and will have a major impact on any DIS network 
design. Because the requirements for video conferencing are not 
clearly identified and because industry offerings are not stable, 
video conferencing is not addressed in this document. This 
requirement will however be addressed in future versions as the 
requirements and available services become better understood. 
1.2.3.2 Interface to C31 systems 
It is anticipated that DIS will interface to Communication, 
Command, Control and Intelligence (ell) systems in the future. 
This issue, however, will require considerable study before any 
actions can be taken. 
1.2.3.3 Interface to Field Instrumentation 
DIS exercises will include participation of Field Instrumentation 
(FI) through the development of interfaces between DIS networks 
and FI equipment. 
1.2.3.4 Interface to High Order Models (e.g. ALSP) 
DIS will be applied to wargame simulations and other high order 
models in the future. Eventually the goal is for next generation 
high order models (e.g. WARSIM 2000) to be DIS compliant and link 
directly to other DIS entities. An interim step is necessary to 
link DIS with existing high order models. An interim step is 
necessary to link DIS with existing high order models. This may 
be done by creating an application gateway between DIS and the 
Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol (ALSP) , the mechanism that 
now links major wargame simulations. 
1.2.3.5 Emerging Technologies 
DIS will be flexible enough to take advantage of emerging 
technologies, such as Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) , 





















gigabit technologies. These technologies will be included in the 
standard as the need for more encompassing communication services 
dictate their use. These technologies will not be included in 
this standard unless they are standardized, but they will not be 
excluded from implementations if they are not standardized. 
1.3 Assumptions 
1.3.1 Layers 6 & 7 Usage 
The DIS standard for protocol data units describes and specifies 
the services of layers 6 and 7, the Presentation and Application 
layers of the protocol stack. The standard addressed by this 
rationale document will therefore not address the services of 
these layers unless they are needed to describe 
services/requirements needed in the lower layers. 
1.3.2 Open Architecture 
The architecture defined in this standard will be open via the 
use of commercial standards and protocols. Nothing proprietary 
will be specified. 
1.3.3 Scalability/Extensibility 
The architecture will be specified such that it is scalable and 
extensible. This will allow DIS systems to be designed to expand 
to meet more encompassing needs and to take advantage of emerging 
technologies. 
1.3.4 Other Uses of the Same Network 
The underlying communication networks used for DIS exercises via 
PDU traffic will also be used for video conferencing, bulk data 
transfer, voice and video. 
1.3.5 Programs (i.e. Gov't Programs) 
There are three categories of DIS applications: simulations, 
which include both manned simulators and Computer Generated 
Forces (CGF): instrumentation, which brings real hardware into 
the loop: and wargames, which incorporates aggregate level 
entities. For all categories, there are both existing DIS 
applications, which will require retro-fitting for the new 
standard and new procurements, which have been called out in the 
DIS standard. Each application has different bandwidth, PDU, and 
entity requirements. 
The communication architecture requirements specified in the 
standard addressed by this rationale document will be utilized by 





















Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) 
Battle Force Tactical Trainer (BFTT) 
Tactical Combat Training System (TCTS) 
Mobile Automated Instrumentation suite (MAIS) 
Tactical Aircrew Combat Training System (TACTS) 
Joint Aircrew Combat Training System (JACTS) 
1.3.6 Compression 
This standard will not specify any means of data compression 
other than what is included in specified protocols. 
1.3.7 Simulation vs Network Management 
For this standard, the distinction is made between simUlation 
management and network management. Simulation management will 
not be specified by this standard. Network management will be 
covered by the specification of network management protocols. 
1.3.8 Long Haul Connection 
Simulators at different sites shall be connected via a wide Area 
Network (WAN). The standard addressed by this document defines 
the functional and performance characteristics which shall be 
satisfied by the communications service, including the WAN. It 
is the goal of this communications architecture that the WAN be 
based on standards such as frame relay, switched Multimegabit 
Data Service (SMDS), Broadband Integrated Services Digital 
Network (ISDN), and Synchronous Optical NETwork (SONET). The 
provision of the WAN will depend on the evolution of these high 
speed communications services in the marketplace and the 
particular organization using the DIS applications. 
Wide area networks today do not in general support 
mUlticasting. If two or three sites using DIS are to participate 
in a demonstration or exercise, they could be interconnected by 
point-to-point circuits or by a network with sufficient capacity 
to support repeated transmission to each site. This, however, 
would become uneconomical for a larger number of sites. 
The nature and development of WANs for DIS application is 
taking two distinct paths. The first is the establishment of a 
permanent infrastructure that will connect all DIS sites. 
Although physically one large network, it will support multiple 
exercises via the creation of individual logical networks for 
each exercise. This approach is called the Defense Simulation 
Internet. The second approach is the establishment of Ad Hoc 
WANs as necessary to support exercises and tests. The primary 
mechanism for this is the bandwidth-on-demands services starting 
to be offered by the major communications suppliers (e.g. AT&T, 
MCI, Sprint). The concept is that a network connecting any set 





















commercial services without the cost of maintaining a permanent 
infrastructure. The Advanced Distributed Simulator Technology 
(ADST) program is exploring this approach. This document does 
not assume either of these approaches and will support both of 
them. 
2. COMMUNICATION FEATURES I SERVICES 
2.1 Communication Service Requirements 
Distributed simulation environment support requires various types 
of communication. The communication requirements encompass 
control and data. Data communications may be with or without 
real time requirements and will likely be augmented to include 
such things as voice, video and other forms of pictorial 
information. Upon the introduction of each of these forms of 
traffic, they shall share communications facilities instead of 
having disjoint facilities for each. 
A summary of the communication service requirements is shown in 
Table I. 
















Low Latency Packet Delivery 
Security 
Flexible Entity Naming & Addressing 
High Throughput 
2.1.1 Service Requirements of PDUs. 
Each DIS PDU requires certain services to make its communication 
practical. These services are grouped into broad classes of 





















2.1.1.1 Communication Classes Based on Requirements. 
This section establishes DIS communication classes based on the 
application service characteristics for both the required and 
recommended interim DIS PDUs. Each DIS PDU requires certain 
service characteristics to make its communication practical. 
These characteristics are grouped into broad classes of operation 
for DIS. 
2.1.1.1.1 Application Requirements. 
The DIS application (PDUs) has been characterized using the 
following subset of communication service requirements: unicast, 
multicast, broadcast, reliable, unreliable, real time, non-real 
time, packet size, and bulk transfer. The application service 
characteristics are used to define a service model necessary to 
support DIS communication. The service model developed from the 
PDU characterization shall be used to develop the interface to 
the application and lower layers. 
2.1.1.1.2 DIS PDU Service Characterization. 
DIS functional requirements are to provide: Entity Information, 
Entity Interaction, DIS Management, and Environment Information. 
within each functional category, PDUs have been defined or 
recommended to satisfy specific requirements. The October 1991 
version of the DIS standard defines ten required PDUs and six 
recommended interim PDUs.' The application services for 
required and recommended DIS PDUs are defined in Tables II and 
III, respectively. 
Although packet size and bulk transfer are included as 
application requirements in 2.1.1.1.1, it is not presented in the 
summary tables for the following reason. Inter-entity 
communication in a distributed interactive simUlation environment 
consists largely of packets sent between two or more of the 
simulation participants. These packets are usually small, < 250 
octets, and constitute the majority of PDU traffic. All PDUs 
listed in Table II and III fall into the "small packet" 
characterization. There are situations which mandate non-real 
time, point-to-point, reliable bulk transfer, however. Such 
situations arise when moving large items such as database files 
or video images. The bulk transfers fall into the Network and/or 
Simulation Management functions, but there are currently no PDUs 
The October version of the DIS standard specifies three recommended 
PDUs for Update Threshold control. As of this writing, those PDUs have been 






















which reflect this type of interaction. Consequently, bulk 





















TABLE II. Required DIS PDU Communication Services 
I Reliable Best BC MC UC Real Effort Time 
Entity (f (f (f 
State 
Fire future (f (f (f 
Detonation future (f (f (f 
Service (f (f (few 
Request seconds) 
Resupply (f (f (few 
Offer seconds) 
Resupply (f (f (few 
Received seconds) 
Resupply (f (f (few 
Cancel seconds) 
Repair (f (f (few 
Complete seconds) 
Repair (f (f (few 
Response seconds) 
Collision (f (f (f 
TABLE III. Recommended DIS PDU Communication Services 
I 
Reliable Best BC MC UC Real 
Effort Time 
Emitter desired (f (f (f 
Laser desired (f (f (f 
Activate (f (f 
Request 
Activate (f (f 
Response 
Deactivate (f (f 
Request 
Deactivate (f (f 
Response 





















DIS Management will require additional capability beyond the 
activation and deactivation PDUs. Although these capabilities 
have not yet specified, Table IV projects additional application 
requirements for these areas. 
TABLE IV. DIS Functional Requirements Communication Services 
I Reliable I Best I 
BC I~ loc I Real Effort Time 
Network ~ ~ 
Management 
simulation ~ desired ~ 
Management 
2.1.1.1.2.1 Entity Information. 
I 
The Entity State PDU (ESPDU) constitutes the bulk of network 
traffic for a simulation exercise. Currently, the appearance 
updates represented by the ESPDU are of most interest to exercise 
participants within a limited radius of the initiating entity. 
Any exercise participant which is not in the area of interest, 
but receives the ESPDU, will have to filter out this unwanted 
information. Therefore, Entity State has a strong requirement 
for multiple multicast interactions. Multicast interactions 
deliver identical packets to multiple recipients as part of a 
single sender operation. A multicast data transfer provides co-
located entity groups the capability of communicating state 
information based on locale in the simulated exercise. 
In addition to their multicast requirements, ESPDUs must be 
delivered in real time but do not need to be transmitted 
reliably. Dead Reckoning (DR) algorithms are used to predict the 
entity's position over time in order to preserve network 
bandwidth by reducing the frequency at which state information is 
required. Reliability need only be a best effort. If an ESPDU 
is lost, the DR models used to reduce network traffic may also be 
able to account for the lost packet. 
2.1.1.1.2.2 Entity Interaction. 
Entity Interaction PDUs have varied characteristics. Within the 
Weapons Fire category, the Fire PDU (FPDU) and the Detonation PDU 
(DPDU) have the same service characterization. Similar to the 
ESPDU, both the FPDU and the DPDU have a strong multicast 
requirement. This requirement allows only those entities within 






















These PDUs are also desired to have a real time requirement in 
the future, and should be as reliable as ESPDUs. Whereas ESPDUs 
can rely on DR to extrapolate position after packet loss, FPDUs 
and DPDUs are not as robust. When a weapon impacts, it is 
crucial that everyone in the multicast group receive that 
information so "killed" targets do not continue to play in the 
exercise. A high degree of reliability is desired for the FPDUs 
and DPDUs, however current multicast protocols do not provide 
this service. Therefore, FPDUs and DPDUs must use a best effort 
realtime multicast service. 
The Logistics support PDUs (i.e., service Request, Resupply 
Offer, Resupply Received, Resupply Cancel, Repair Complete, and 
Repair Response) represent activities which, although long in 
duration, do not require real time service. The resupply and 
repair interactions require a simple reliable transaction 
(request/reply) paradigm. This reliability is built into the 
application by pairing the acknowledgement (or reply) PDU with 
the request (e.g., Service Request and Resupply Offer PDUs). The 
Logistics Support PDUs do not require multicast, because only the 
entities involved in the service are interested. Therefore, the 
Logistics Support PDUs are characterized as requiring an 
unreliable unicast service. 
The last required category of PDUs in Entity Interaction is 
Collisions. Collision PDUs require a real time, unicast service. 
Again, only the entities involved in the collision will be 
interested in this information. Changes in entity appearance 
resulting from the collision will be communicated using ESPDUs. 
The only category of PDUs not required for Entity Interaction is 
Electromagnetic Interaction. Electromagnetic Interaction 
currently consists of two recommended PDUs, Emitter and Laser. 
Both PDUs desire a reliable real time multicast transmission but, 
as stated before, this is not available. Therefore, these PDUs 
are characterized as requiring best effort real time multicast. 
2.1.1.1.2.3 DIS Management. 
There are no PDUs specified for Network Management. Network 
management will be handled by a standard network management 
protocol (e.g., Simple Network Management Protocol or Common 
Management Information Protocol) and will not require DIS PDUs to 
accomplish the management of the physical network. Network 
management is accomplished with an unreliable unicast service. 
The Simulation Management category of PDUs is responsible for the 
activation and deactivation of simulation players. The request 
to activate or deactivate entities in a simulation exercise 
requires a simple reliable transaction (request/reply) paradigm. 
The reliability is built into the application by pairing the 








characterized as non-real time unicast. other possible functions 
of Simulation Management include management and control messages 
spanning multiple exercises. This type of service desires a 
reliable multicast transmission, however reliable multicast is 
not currently available. Therefore, this type of service is 
characterized as reliable unicast. In addition to the packet 
form of interaction, there are situations which mandate non-real 
time, point-to-point, reliable bulk transfer. Such situations 
arise when moving large items such as databases or video images. 
Standard file transfer protocols such as File Transfer Protocol 
(FTP) or File Transfer Access and Management (FTAM) will be used. 
There are no PDUs required or recommended for Performance 
Measures. If PDUs are developed for this functional area, the 
required services will fall into one of the established service 
classes. 
I 2.1.1.1.2.4 Environment Information. 
I 
There are no PDUs required or recommended for Environment 
Information. If PDUs are developed for this functional area, the 
required services will fall into one of the established service 
classes. 











From the previously stated rationale, three service models emerge 





A mode of operation where the multicast service 
provider uses no added mechanisms for reliability 
except those inherent in the underlying service. 
Unreliable Unicast 
A mode of operation where the unicast service 
provider uses no added mechanisms for reliability 
except those inherent in the underlying service. 
Reliable unicast 
A mode of operation where the unicast service 
provider uses whatever mechanisms are available to 
ensure the data is delivered in sequence with no 
duplicates and no errors. 





















TABLE V. DIS Application Service Model 
CLASS 1 CLASS 2 CLASS 3 
Unreliable Unreliable Reliable 
Multicast Unicast Unicast 
Entity Service Collision 
state Request 








































2.2 Communications Models 
One of the important tasks facing the DIS standards community is 
determining the services DIS requires from the communication 
systems with which a simulator is implemented. For such a 
determination to take place, certain terms and classes of service 
must be defined, then the advantages and/or limitations of each 
class of service must be described. The goal of this section is 
to provide a high-level view of the different services under 
consideration for DIS . 
In this section, a connection is a named association of endpoints 
and communications resources. For correct network operation, 
this name must be unique across a communications network at any 
one point in time. The term "connection" is used in reference 
both to the logical endpoint association and to the association's 
physical realization in network state and topology. An open 
connection is one which has undergone initial setup and whose 
name has been specified. closing a connection dissolves the 
association of endpoints and releases the connection's resources. 
A persistent connection requires an explicit setup procedure, but 
can later be referenced by name with little management overhead. 
TCP opens persistent connections (from a user perspective, at 
least). A transient or connectionless connection exists for the 
life of a single message; subsequent messages between the same 
endpoints might require further setup overhead (though some 
implementations attempt to alleviate this drawback). Some uses 
of UDP open transient connections. 
The process of associating an endpoint with a connection is 
called adding the endpoint into the connection. There are two 
kinds of adding: a join begins with a request from the endpoint 
to the connection, and an invite begins with a request from the 
connection to the endpoint. Disassociating an endpoint from a 
connection is called dropping the endpoint from the connection. 
An example network which is referenced in the following 
discussion is shown in Figure 1, along with a very "generic" 
connection. The network consists of nine simulators at four 
sites. Bold lines indicate links which are associated with the 
connection. Arrows indicate a direction of data flow; numbers 
adjacent to arrows indicate some arbitrary measure of necessary 
resources ("bandwidth"). The connection shows eight participant 
simulators, each with different transmit and receive resource 
requirements. Note that simulator b is receive-only. The 
bidirectional sum of necessary resources for a connection is 
identical for all associated links, and is equal to the sum of 





















Figure 1. Example Network with Generic connection 
2.2.1. Number of Endpoints in a connection 
connections are often characterized by the number of endpoints 
with which they are associated. Perhaps the most common 
connection is between two endpoints. This is referred to as 
unicast. Two unicast connections are shown in Figure 2. The 
connection between band d is two-way unicast, since both 
transmit; the connection between q and h is one-way unicast, 
since only q is transmitting. 





















connections between a subset of all possible endpoints are 
multicast. Figure 3 illustrates two multicast connections. The 
left-hand connection is many-to-many, since all endpoints 
transmit. The right-hand connection is one-to-many, since only f 
transmits. 
Figure 3. Multicast Connections 
When all possible endpoints are associated with a connection, the 
connection is broadcast. A one-to-all broadcast connection is 
presented in Figure 4; only e is transmitting. If all endpoints 
were transmitting, the broadcast would be all-to-all. 





















It should be noted that both unicast and broadcast are special 
cases of multicast. Since it is rarely the case that all 
endpoints attached to a network are associated with a connection 
(in general, only network management functions might require 
broadcast), most DIS connections are multicast, with a few 
unicast connections. 
2.2.2 Connection Resource Allocation 
The resources (and endpoints, since they require resources) 
allocated to a persistent connection can be static, or fixed, at 
the time of connection setup, or they can be dynamic, changeable 
during the life of the connection. static vs. dynamic resource 
allocation has implications with respect to: 
• connection control/ownership, 
• communications link routing, and 
• bandwidth allocation. 
Protocols exist where some of these three properties are static, 
while others are dynamic. 
The "owning," or controlling, endpoint of a connection is quite 
important for most protocols. The owner might direct which other 
endpoints join or drop out of the connection, might specify the 
resources requested for the connection, is generally billed for 
the connection, and is usually designated somehow within the name 
of the connection. with such single-owner protocols, if the 
owner endpoint fails or needs to drop out of connection, the 
entire connection might be closed. Some protocols allow for such 
occurrences by providing a mechanism for ownership "handoff" to 
another endpoint in the connection. 
Though routing and bandwidth allocation are strongly coupled, 
most protocol implementations make routing the more inflexible 
resource, once established. Dynamic adding of new endpoints into 
a connection can make bandwidth demands which invalidate previous 
routing decisions: a link which can support 5 endpoints might 
not support 10 endpoints. If a protocol is not capable of re-
routing under such circumstances, it can not guarantee service to 
added endpoints without worst-case bandwidth allocation at the 
time of connection setup. 
2.2.3 Per-Message Reliability 
A reliable connection provides a mechanism to guarantee that each 
message is delivered and delivered intact. Protocols supporting 
such connections require some form of acknowledgement and 
retransmission facility. Unreliable connections make no delivery 
guarantees. 
Reliable protocols are well-understood for unicast connections. 





















incurred by a reliable multicast transmitter while processing the 
acknowledgement/retransmission data for all receiving endpoints 
can be unacceptably high. Furthermore, the definition of "all 
receiving endpoints" is a problem for connections which allow 
dynamic adding and dropping of endpoints. How does an endpoint 
acquire a list of the other endpoints in a connection, then 
maintain that list up-to-date? A related and similarly handled 
problem, that of determining whether or not a connection is open, 
is discussed in more detail in the next sUbsection. 
2.2.4 Associating Endpoints with Multicast Connections 
Let us begin with the fundamental question "How does a new 
endpoint n become associated with a connection C?" The endpoint 
might be associated for the duration of an exercise, or for only 
a short portion of an exercise. The endpoint might need to be 
associated just with C, or with C along with several other 
connections related, in some manner, to C. Our question is tied 
to several issues: 
• ownership of connections, 
• what happens to a connection when the "last" endpoint 
drops out, and 
• sets of related connections. 
Given the operations defined previously in this section, there 
are three ways for n to become associated with C: 
1) n can be invited into C by some endpoint e already in 
C, 
2) n can join C, or 
3) n can open C. 
The first possibility assumes that some endpoint e in C knows 
that n should be invited into C. This assumption is valid for 
connections with a static set of endpoints, but not for 
connections with endpoints dynamically joining. The other two 
possibilities are alternatives depending on whether or not C is 
open. Actions take place based on that knowledge: the answer to 
the query "is C open?" can not change between the time n poses 
the query and acts on the result. Some means must exist to 
assure that C should not be closed or will not be opened by some 
other endpoint. The query is but one phase of a full-fledged 
distributed database transaction. 
In order to determine if C is open, n must route to some 
information base with knowledge about C. A multicast connection 
associates a set of endpoints, not just two. As such, it is not 
always the best choice to name a connection by distinguishing one 
endpoint (which would usually be the owner). The obvious 
information base with knowledge about C is some endpoint already 
in C. If no such endpoint is identified through the connection 





















Three approaches can resolve this situation: 
1) C is always open and a route to it is well-known, 
2) some well-known endpoint always knows if C is open, or 
3) all endpoints can be queried to determine if C is open. 
If C is always open, n must still be able to route to it for a 
join to take place. The most common example of this arrangement 
is that messages in C are actually a "filtered" subset of the 
messages of some general, statically-opened connection G. 
"Joining" C simply means that n's G-filter is modified to accept 
another type of message. 
Approach 2 implies the existence of a database server with global 
knowledge of all open connections and some means to route to 
them. One logical choice for this a statically-open Global 
Exercise Manager, about which all joining endpoints would have 
enough data so that they could route to and query it. 
Both approaches 1 and 2 allow C to remain open across points in 
time when, temporarily, no platform-simulation endpoints are 
associated with C. For approach 1, G is open independently of C. 
For approach 2, if the database server or some other statically-
added endpoint owns the connection, it logically acts as "the 
last endpoint" from a protocol point of view. 
Approach 3 requires a query of all possible endpoints which might 
be associated with or own C. First, this implies broadcast, at 
least within the scope of all possible - not just current - DIS 
exercise participants. Second, and more important, is the 
transaction nature of associating n with C. C should not close 
while n is attempting to join it, but some other endpoint must 
not open C while n is trying to open C. This is a classic 
"distributed consensus" or "distributed snapshot" problem. 
Algorithms to resolve such problems are known, but are complex 
and not implementable across even local area networks within the 
real-time latency limits identified by CASSo This approach is 
thus of questionable merit for connections requiring dynamic 
joining and/or dropping of endpoints. 
Back to the original list of issues above, the final issue 
concerns sets of "related" connections. For instance, n might 
need to join connections C, D, E, and F. A very dynamic example 
of this arises from the "segmented battlefield" concept for 
defining multicast connections as representing geographic areas. 
Targeting handoff could bring several areas, and thus 
connections, into a platform's field of interest simultaneously. 
High-range sensors might deal best with much larger segments of 
geographic area than do short-range sensors, lest they be 
required to listen to literally hundreds of connections at once. 
Both real-time multiple-connection joining and hierarchial 






















2.2.5 Multicast Resource Allocation and Routing Policy 
Protocols which implement multicast connections generally handle 
the case of multiple transmitters in one of two ways. These 
approaches are: 
• allocate resources for the connection as a whole, or 
• allocate resources on a per-transmitter basis. 
These two approaches can be effectively the same for connections 
with a static set of endpoints; they might exhibit tradeoffs only 
for connections which support dynamic adding and dropping of 
endpoints. 
Protocols which treat a connection as a whole can route and 
allocate resources more rapidly than those which independently 
route and allocate for each transmitter. Potential 
disadvantages, however, begin to be apparent when one starts 
adding endpoints. Either sufficient "worst case" bandwidth must 
have been allocated to the connection at setup time, or 
additional bandwidth must be allocated for the new transmitters. 
This brings up the possibility of forcing a re-route, or of 
refusing service to the new endpoints. 
Those whole-connection protocols which support route 
reconfiguration per transmitter can avoid service refusal in this 
case. Even those which can re-route do not necessarily establish 
an optimal route. Whole-connection allocation generally 
overallocates bidirectional bandwidth on internal network links. 
Whereas, in the optimal state, the sum of bandwidth in both 
directions along a link equals the total transmitter bandwidth, 
whole-connection allocation is usually defined so that the 
bandwidth in each direction is set to the total transmitter 
bandwidth. Requested, and thus billed, bandwidth is twice the 
optimal requirement. Due to such bandwidth overallocation and 
due to routing all transmitters through the same links, routes 
are theoretically harder to find through congested networks. 
Protocols which always allocate and route per-transmitter can 
allocate bandwidth exactly and can more easily route around 
network congestion points. connection management for adding and 
dropping endpoints is much more difficult, though. Messages for 
the "same" connection can come in from different links. 
Processing and hardware overhead exists for maintaining and 
merging the different physical connections into one logical 
connection. Each incoming link can exhibit different latency 
properties, so messages from different simulators at the same 
site can arrive at quite different times. Whenever an endpoint n 
adds in or drops out, all other endpoints in the connection must 
be updated to connect to or disconnect from n. For a connection 
c, this is a distributed transaction problem of similar 
complexity to the "is C open?" query, but requires processing by 






















As a distributed transaction, the add/drop problem is amenable to 
either a database server or distributed snapshot solution. 
Complex, protocol-specific endpoint management appears to be 
outside the scope of CASS' task and against the "open 
architecture" premise of DIS. Protocols which do not perform 
multi-transmitter endpoint management themselves are thus not 
suitable for connections requiring dynamic adding and dropping of 
endpoints, though are suitable for connections whose endpoints 
are statically determined. 
The issue of efficiency in per-transmitter bandwidth allocation 
and routing does not exist if service must be guaranteed for the 
full duration of an exercise. For an endpoint not to be refused 
a join into a connection, bandwidth for that endpoint must be 
available. This can not be guaranteed unless sufficient 
bandwidth for all potential endpoints is reserved at the time of 
exercise setup (as is the case for leased lines, but not 
necessarily for commercial service where other users are also on 
the network). If worst-case resources must be pre-allocated, 
per-transmitter allocation provides no savings. 
2.3 Grouping of PDUs 
Non-contention digital communications systems operate most 
efficiently (i.e. have the greatest throughput) when the packets 
that they handle are at or near the basic maximum length for 
which they were designed (e.g. 4352 octets for FDDI). This is 
due to the fact that overhead portions of the packet are of 
constant length and the processing time for each packet is fairly 
constant. Therefore the ratio of user data to overhead increases 
as the length of packet increases. If, however, message length 
becomes greater than the basic maximum packet length, the 
communications system must break the message up into smaller 
units. Such activity increases overhead and reduces efficiency. 
The PDUs defined in the DIS program are relatively small compared 
to the maximum data area of a typical packet (e.g. with frame 
size for IP=20, UDP=8, and TCP=20, Ethernet data area for DIS 
PDUs is 1472 octets long for UDP+IP and 1460 octets long for 
TCP+IP). If each PDU is sent via a separate packet, the overhead 
ratio would be high and the throughput would be limited. One 
method of improving the situation is to pack multiple PDUs into a 
single communications packet. To this end we recommend that: 
1. A single platform simulator group all the PDUs generated by 
a single iteration of its model(s) into packets. This may 
result in entity state, emissions, fire, and voice PDUs in a 
single packet. However, PDUs should not be "collected" from 
iteration to iteration of the models just to make 





















excessive delays between the time the PDU is created and the 
time it is sent. 
2. A Computer Generated Force (CGF) unit group as many entity 
state (and other PDUs) as possible into each communications 
packet. 
3. A gateway or router consolidate those PDUs arriving within a 
short time interval (e.g. 10 to 20 milliseconds) into 
maximum sized communications packets. 
Concatenating moderately sized PDUs within LANs is likely to 
improve bandwidth utilization at a cost in increased latency. 
One negative impact of concatenation on latency is the increased 
processing time required to examine queues for pending 
transmittals with the same destination. with a frame size limit 
of 1500 octets, Ethernet LANs are poor candidates for 
concatenation of moderately sized DIS PDUs. While the frame size 
in FDDI is considerably larger (4352 octets) and is fixed length, 
its transmission rate is an order of magnitude greater than 
Ethernet. Thus, the token holding period expires quickly and the 
node can easily lose its transmission window while trying to pack 
additional PDUs into the frame. A second negative impact on 
latency comes from the increase probability of collisions in a 
contention environment (e.g. Ethernet, packet radio)--increase 
packet size results in a greater probability that some portion of 
the packet will collide with another packet. 
It is in long haul where the benefits of concatenation usually 
outweigh the cost. Encryption overhead is applied to each packet 
regardless of size. Each router/gateway connects to a dedicated 
link and generally more limited bandwidth (a T1 provides from 0.1 
to 0.01 the bandwidth of the LANs it connects), latency issues 
may become secondary to efficient use of bandwidth. It should 
also be noted that the LAN(s) at either end of the gateway will 
have already filtered out packets with destinations that they can 
handle, so the gateway parses a more limited subset of 
destinations. 
It is most important to remember that all PDUs put into the same 
communications packet will be sent to the same destination. 
Therefore PDUs with different destinations should never be put 
into the same packet. 
The maximum number of octets available for PDUs as viewed from 
layer seven (application) is a function of the maximum packet 
size of the level two protocol used (e.g. Ethernet), less the 
overhead (packet headers and trailers) used by the intervening 
layers. 
The packing of multiple PDUs into communications packets must be 





















doing so in the COTS protocol suites defined in for phase 0,1 or 
2. The mechanism for packing PDUs is left to the developer of 
the application layer software. We do recommend that this 
function be provided in third party Network Interface units (NIU) 
being developed for the DIS market. 
There is no mechanism specified as to how the PDUs are to be 
packed (they are simply concatenated in a buffer) and there is no 
indication in the communications packet that it contains multiple 
PDUs. A recommendation for a Concatenation PDU to make the 
situation explicit has floated around the DIS community for some 
time but has been rejected. For this reason we strongly 
recommend that the input processing software (commercial NIUs 
included) assume that there are multiple PDUs in each received 
packet. 
Multiple PDUs should be concatenated into a single UDP datagram 
for Phase o. No extra framing or encapsulation is needed. 
2.4 Packet Length 
Packet length in DIS will be largely determined by the specific 
PDU length and required protocol headers. In general, the 
characteristics of the architecture will determine whether 
extremely large PDUs or moderately sized PDUs (500 to 1000 
octets) are optimal. Small PDUs (less than 100 octets) are never 
optimal simply because the ratio of header overhead to user data 
is excessive (e.g. 54 additional octets in the case of an 
802.3jIPjUDP LAN). 
For Phase 0, the IP data portion of a packet can, in theory, be 
up to 64K octets, however, transmitting PDUs in excess of 1500 
octets is a less efficient use of bandwidth and processor 
capacity for Ethernet LANs. 
2.4.2 Fragmentation 
At least one DIS PDU has already been defined to exceed some LAN 
limits (in the worst case, the variable length Emitter PDU may be 
9632 octets, see section 4.1.1). This would require 
fragmentation in some LANs. Since all IP implementations are 
required to support reassembly but not fragmentation (see RFC 
1122), any host IP implementation to be used by DIS should be 
required to support both fragmentation and reassembly, with a 
maximum reassembled datagram size of at least 10000 octets, and 
preferably unlimited. The size of the individual fragments, 
before reassembly, will vary according to the limits on the 
various LANs and WANs in the path that a PDU takes. Many popular 
IP implementations refuse to broadcast (or multicast) packets 
that require fragmentation; the ability to broadcast and 
multicast fragmented datagrams should be required for any 


















2.5 Bandwidth Reservation / Guarantee 
The need for a reservations service is tied directly to the 
offered load of the network in relation to peak utilization. In 
an undersubscribed network, the need for a reservations service 
is negligible--in a heavily oversubscribed network, the need for 
reservations may be substantial, but the cost will also be 
substantial. For DIS configurations, as is typical of many large 
networks, the need for reservations will increase with increased 
distance, number of links and number LANs. To ensure the 
availability of capacity for exercises involving longhaul, it 
will be necessary to support a reservation service by Phase 1 of 
DIS. 
In an oversubscribed network with both reservations and demand 
assigned, a reservations strategy will either require that: 
1. the reservation can force the clear down of no-reservation 
allocations to obtain the necessary end-to-end capacity; 
2. the reservation can negotiate with Local Exercise Managers 
(LEMs) to impose flow control, in a manner that restricts 
flow on the non-reservations allocations up to the point 
that the reservations connections can be satisfied; 
3. the reservation can wait for currently allocated bandwidth 
to be released--this strategy is most satisfactory when 
there are traffic statistics which can be used to estimate 
the amount of time prior to a reservation that allocations 
must be blocked (unavailable to any requester other than the 
reservation) to ensure that capacity is available at the 
start time of the reservation. 
A quick assessment of the above strategies will show that (1) is 
really the only "Guaranteed" allocation, and is both brutal and 
simple. strategy (2) results in degraded (but not interrupted) 
service for the non-reservations subscriber. It is an elegant 
solution with a hint of danger (lacks robustness). Finally, (3) 
is the classic solution for circuit switched common carrier 
networks that also offer premium services (e.g. video 
teleconferencing). Given extremely large capacity networks of 
demand assigned subscribers and a small percentage of 
reservations subscribers, this approach (3) is almost guaranteed. 
It is also the most wasteful, in terms of unused and unavailable 
bandwidth and requires a very centralized, statistically based 
implementation. Thus, strategy (1) is recommended for DIS and 
may be implemented at either the GEM (Global Exercise Manager) or 
at a LEM. 
2.5.1 Method of Allocation 























allocations involving multiple physical links over multiple 
subnets, the best point at which to process reservation control 
messages is in the transport layer. Defined in the OSI Transport 
Layer Service Definition, is the Quality of Service (QOS) 
parameter list. One of the QOS control parameters is 'priority'; 
it is recommended that this field be made available to a 
reservation service. An associated parameter is 'throughput' 
which is further subdivided into directional and measured (vs. 
allocated) throughput. Coupled with each priority designation, 
then, would be the allocated throughput. 
For Phase 0, the IP TOS field can be used. This field includes 
flags which request low delay, high throughput, high reliability, 
or low cost (no combinations are allowed), as well as a three-bit 
priority field. 
2.5.2 Start Time and Duration 
Exercises are initiated and controlled at the GEM or LEM. 
Reservations are explicitly part of an exercise. At some 
appropriate interval prior to the reservation's desired start 
time, connections will be requested for the participating nodes 
(hosts). GEM or LEM processors will initiate requests to connect 
between the logically assigned nodes. The exercise manager will 
also initiate disconnects when the exercise is completed. 
Subnets are assumed to be asynchronous, so commands from the 
Exercise Manager are executed as received. 
A LEM or GEM should place an upper limit in the total capacity 
available for reservations. In a token bus or token ring network 
with no demand assigned (non-reserved allocations), it may be 
possible to set this threshold at 90% capacity, however, in a 
mixed network with one or more contention subnets (e.g. ALOHA, 
CSMA/CD), the threshold may be anywhere from 18% to 50% of total 
capacity in the subnet. 
2.5.3 congestion Control 
The triggering of congestion control should be infrequent in 
Phase 1 or 2 of DIS, since most allocations will be connection 
oriented. Nonetheless, equipment failure and the mixing of 
processors and communications links of widely varying capacities, 
will necessitate a congestion control mechanism. Nodes with 
reservation should honor choke messages, however, centrally 
issued choke messages (e.g. from a GEM or LEM or LAN node 
controller) should be ordered such that non-reservations 
connections to the congested node are sent choke packets before 
reservations connections. If a congested node or gateway is the 
transmitter of choke packets, it should throttle non-reservations 
connections before reservations connections. 
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Reservation allocations should not be decreased by imposing flow 
control. Conversely, a reservation should not be allowed to 
increase its allocation after initialization by using flow 
control requests. 
A reservation implies a static environment with connectivity 
completed at initialization. However, if there is a problem at a 
gateway or along a long haul path, and if alternate paths exist 
with sufficient capacity for the reservation, the reservation 
should be dynamically routed to the alternate path. 
2.5.5 Contiguous Allocations 
For some non-digitized video, audio and sensor transmissions, it 
is not possible to incur delays in between packets without a 
noticeable breakup on the receive side. For that reason, one of 
the possible uses of reservations will be to allocate a 
connection as contiguous bandwidth in blocks of 32 kbps, 64 kbps, 
384 kbps, etc. Such allocations require access to the node's 
station management functions (at the MAC and PHY layers) using 
the MIB (Management Information Base) at these layers as well as 
the transport/network layer MIB. Node to node (or GEM/LEM) 
control is initiated using SNMP messages. It may be necessary to 
force reduced traffic loading (via flow control messages) on 
contention LANs or WANs, if these long sequences of frames are to 
avoid collisions. Use of flow control packets in this case would 
be restricted to reservations initialization and to contention 
type subnets. 
2.5.6 Problems with Concurrent Reservation Initialization 
LEMs and the GEM must be able to communicate with each other 
during the implementation of a reservation. While a reservation 
is being initialized from one Exercise Manager, all the other 
Exercise Managers should inhibit any reservations implementation 
of their own. This avoids dual seizure conditions and partial 
allocation deadlocks. 
Two or more LEMs establishing connections concurrently for two or 
more reservations with similar start times, may result in partial 
and incomplete allocations. For example, if along LinkA only 500 
kbps is available and within LinkB only 400 kbps is available and 
both LEMI and LEM2 need 300 kbps on LinkA and LinkB to satisfy 
the two different reservations, the following could occur if 
concurrent reservation initialization is allowed: 
LEMI allocates and holds 300 kbps along LinkA and LEM2 
allocates and holds 300 kbps along LinkB. Now each Exercise 
Manager attempts to complete the reservation but both find 





















link they need. Neither can satisfy their reservation so 
both reservations are denied. 
In fact, one of the reservations could have been satisfied if 
LEMI had been allowed to allocate a complete reservation before 
LEM2 initialized its reservation request. 
Two or more LEMs establishing a connection concurrently for two 
or more reservations, may also result in a blockage referred to 
as a dual seizure. For example, LEMI begins establishing a 
connection by allocating the remaining capacity from point A to B 
to C to D. At the same time, LEM2 attempts to establish a 
connection from point D to C to B to A. Both Exercise Managers 
reach an impasse at the B/C boundary coming from opposite 
directions. One must back off to let the other complete the 
connection. The problem is easily avoided if concurrent 
reservation initialization is prohibited. 
2.5.7 Advance Reservation Logging 
Exercise Managers should provide a service which stores a 
reservation in advance. This allows two important features to be 
implemented at the GEM/LEMs: 
1. Negotiation rather than denial -- The Exercise Manager can 
implement a dialogue which examines alternative capacity, 
start time, duration and node connectivity values with the 
requester, if the original reservation request is likely to 
be denied. 
2. Efficient use of capacity -- Advance Reservations can result 
in capacity utilization which approaches the efficiency of 
token ring or TDM strategies rather than that of contention 
techniques. 
The above, of course, assumes that there is no reservations 
override option and that reservations are honored on a first come 
first served basis. 
3. ARCHITECTURE 
3.1 Topology and components 
The basic job of the communication subsystem is to provide an 
application interface for the DIS protocol with interconnection 
between each of the participating simulation and simulation 
support entities. The environment is heterogeneous, multi-vendor, 
multiple developers, and multiple owning or operating agencies. 
Heterogeneity extends not only to the collection of participating 
hosts, but also to the variety of communication medium, various 
operating systems, and various languages for software 





















communications subsystem as a protocol stack of 7 layers. The DIS 
PDUls are application messages which connect with the Application 
Programs. The applications contain entities, environmental 
objects and other objects such as simulation support services. 
End System (ES), End System (ES), 
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Figure 5: Communications Subsystem Architecture 
Various types of communication facilities can be used to form the 
virtual network as illustrated in Figure 6. The communications 
medium, a the lowest level, include wire, fiber-optic, satellite, 
micro-wave, etc. These medium may be used interchangeably, as 
performance characteristics permit. communication services should 
be independent of the means of communication, to the maximum 
extent possible. Figure 5 also illustrates that applications 
include manned battlefield simulators, Computer Generated Forces 
and real instrumented platforms. A Cell is a homogenous set of 
simulators which can be distributed in a variety of ways. Cell 
Adapter units (CAUs) interface between non-DIS compliant 
applications and the DIS protocol. Hosts are defined by 
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various types of communication are needed to support a 
distributed simulation environment. These currently include 
control, data, voice, real time, non-real time, and will likely 
be augmented in the future to include such things video and other 
forms of pictorial information. It is desirable from a usage and 
communication management perspective for these various forms of 
traffic to share communications facilities, instead of having 
different and disjoint facilities for each type of communication. 
Man-in-the-Ioop simulator based training and experimentation are 
the domains of interest. Thus, a lower performance bound is set 
by certain interactions which must proceed at human reaction 
rates which reflect the situation being simulated. 
It is anticipated·that multiple, simultaneous, independent 
training sessions will take place even on a single instance of a 
DIS facility. Therefore, mechanisms must be provided to ensure 
the separation and non-interference of these potentially 
conflicting activities. Similarly, there is a need for including 
some simulation components whose operating characteristics are 
classified. Mechanisms are required to ensure the separation of 
secure and non-secure parts of a simulation activity. In lieu of 
such mechanisms, entire simulation exercises must be insecure or 
secure at the same level. 
The network design issues are naming, addressing, routing, flow 
control and congestion control. Real time, low latency traffic 
and non-real time traffic will have different 
requirements/tolerance of the performance impact of flow control 
mechanisms. 
3.1.1 Naming 
communication functions include a means for naming the entities 
participating in the communication. Naming functions are distinct 
and separable from addressing functions, which help to route 
messages to their proper (named) destination. Addressing 
functions are most often associated with an architecture or 
communication system design, while naming is often more related 
to the application of the communication. For simulation, names 
need to be assigned not only to hosts, but to simulated entities 
and perhaps their parts, and other services which populate the 
simulation environment. 
Flexibility in the naming of the communicating entities will 
support flexibility and modularity in the application designs and 
implementations utilizing the communication. Flexible naming is 
one aspect of moving toward a more "object-oriented" system 
paradigm. Additionally, as the simulation environment gets more 
global and far reaching, it also gets more complex. This 
increases the necessity to separate the relatively infrequently 
changing name structure, from the relatively more frequently 





















naming in support of multicast operations. In DIS phase 0 there 
is no specific name service required. 
3.1.2 Addressing 
Inter-entity communication in a distributed interactive 
simulation environment consists largely of packets sent between 
two or more of the simulation participants. Messages are 
exchanged largely within an individual exercise, however some 
management and control type of communication could span multiple 
exercises. Additionally, although it is not currently the case, 
certain "servers" which may be costly to replicate could service 
clients in multiple exercise simultaneously. 
Addresses exist at each level of the ISO model. At level 7, the 
entities are addressed. An entity contains three fields: Entity 
ID, site and host. The Entity ID is an unique address for the 
exercise. Entities can fire weapons as "events". These events 
exist in an address space relative to the originating entity. The 
Site is one interface on the Wide Area Network. The host is the 
simulator or Computer Generated Forces computer. Cells and 
exercises define groups of entities, but they do not have a 
network address. In the future, it is likely that entities can 
migrate between hosts or even between sites. This means that the 
Layer 7 address should be kept separate from any lower layer 
address. 
The distributed simulation environment has a requirement for 
multiple 1-to-many interactions to maintain a shared notion of 
system state. These types of interactions, frequently referred to 
as multicast, deliver identical PDU's to multiple recipients, as 
part of a single operation on the part of the sender. In some 
cases, the many is a large group, typically all entities 
participating in a particular exercise (e.g. the entity state 
PDU). Many of these participants will be both sources and sinks 
of multicast activity. 
Current implementations of multicast addresses occur at Layers 2, 
3 and 4. At layer 2 the Local Area Network, IEEE 802.2, standard 
multicast addressing is used. The network layer multicast 
address, i.e., Internet Protocol in Phase 0, is used to map into 
the link layer address at Layer 2. The Internet Activities Board 
administrate the internet address space. Multicast addressing 
have already been allocated for special needs. For the DIS 
protocol, the network layer multicast is allocated to the 
Exercise ID and the Protocol Version number. The Layer 4 protocol 
provides the transport service. The address is the port ID. 
Additional multicast addressing can occur for ports. The DIS 
protocol is mapped into one preassigned port ID for the User 





















In some cases the group associated with the multicast may be 
dynamic, with entities coming and going during the course of an 
exercise. In other cases, the groups may be static and setup 
prior to the execution of the exercise. It is anticipated, based 
on current experience, that a large number of multicast groups 
will eventually be needed. 
3.1.3 Routing 
Routing is performed by the gateway system. The gateway routing 
minimizes the number of "hops" to reduce latency, and routes 
multicast addressed PDU's to their destinations. The gateways can 
choose, independently from the DIS application, to use a 
connection-oriented or a connectionless protocol. In the 
connection-oriented approach, virtual circuits are established 
between the source site and all destination sites in the 
exercise. PDU's are then copied on each virtual circuit. The 
gateway effectively operate as a virtual Bridge. 
In the connectionless approach, gateways route PDU's to minimize 
the number of hops. A desired property for the connectionless 
approach in DIS is that it also minimize the number of packet 
copies. Example protocols are the Internet Activity Boards 
Multicast OSPF and ST-II. 
3.1.4 Flow Control 
The flow control objective is the need to sustain real time 
operating speeds. Applications for training and evaluation 
purposes which include manned simulations need to keep pace with 
the real world entities they model, and with human reaction time. 
Our concern here is on the impact of inter-entity communication 
performance on network performance. Higher performance networks 
make more interactions per unit time feasible, and better 
compression techniques (e.g. dead reckoning, which compresses the 
number of messages needed, not the content of a message) make 
fewer interactions per unit time possible. 
When we introduce "voice" data messages to the mix of traffic, 
another dimension of flow control becomes important. To be able 
to collect together and replay continuous voice messages, the 
inter-message dispersion in time of the individual parts can not 
be degraded too much. Current experience in this area suggests 
that an initial target for effective communication of continuous 
speech is inter-message dispersion of less than 50 milliseconds. 
3.1.4.1 Error Control 
section 2.1 identifies PDUs which shall be delivered reliably. 
This means that each of those PDUs shall be delivered to its 
destination without error. Implied in this definition is that 





















if necessary. Such acknowledgement and retransmission will be 
handled by the error detection/correction mechanism of the 
protocols used at level 4 and below. That is, there is no action 
required at the application level other than to indicate that a 
particular PDU is to be sent reliably. The receiving application 
can assume that all PDUs sent reliably are in order and intact. 
PDUs not requiring reliable delivery shall be given best 
effort delivery. These PDUs make up the bulk of network traffic 
and include those PDUs that are multicast to all simulators in a 
DIS exercise. Acknowledgement and retransmission, associated 
with reliable delivery, is not feasible due to the additional 
latency and network bandwidth that would be required. There is 
also the possibility that a PDU with corrupted data may be 
received. The processing of such corrupted data may create 
unacceptable behavior in the receiving simulator. To prevent 
this, the DIS communications architecture shall include in its 
best effort delivery a checksum mechanism. Because this type of 
checksum is specific to DIS, its location in the protocol stack 
has not been defined. This checksum shall include the entire 
PDU. If a checksum error is detected in a received PDU, the PDU 
shall be discarded by the communications software. That is, it 
shall not be made visible to the application. 
3.1.5 congestion Control 
Congestion occurs when the demand is greater than the available 
resources. The problem of congestion is not solved as resources 
become less expensive, such as computers, or as higher speed 
networks become available, such as FDDI and the Gbit networks. 
For example, suppose the LAN in Figure 2 is an FDDI and the WAN 
is the Defense Simulation Internet (DSI). The high speed LAN 
without proper congestion control can lead to reduced 
performance. with the high speed link, the arrival rate to the 
first gateway can become much higher than the departure rate, 
leading to long queues, buffer overflows, and packet losses that 
cause the latency and transfer time to increase. 
One solution is demand reduction schemes. A slow-down control 
packet, known as the "source quench", is sent from the gateway to 
the source host. It is the hosts responsibility to reduce the 
speed by locating the offending entities and reducing their 
activity. The host could change dead-reckoning thresholds, or 
decrease the number of entities. The scheme must be fair. If one 
simulator is favored over another, it is more difficult to assure 
a "fair fight". 
Another solution is to use prioritized traffic, so that lower 
priority PDUs are lost first in overflow situations. The question 
is how to prioritize the PDUs. The Entity state PDUs could be 
placed at a lower priority than other PDUs because the 
















there is a limit on how many lost Entity State PDUs can occur 
before visual cues such as jumps are noticed. Therefore, we do 
not recommend a priority scheme for congestion control. 
For the phase 0 system, there are only two different speed links, 
the WAN and the LAN. The congestion control problem is handled 
using the source quench Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
packet. Designing a scheme that allows slower paths to be used 
depending upon the load levels on all paths is a topic for 
further study 
3.1.6 Interoperability with Non-DIS Systems 
There are three types of Non-DIS cells to be considered: 
1. Previously Stand-alone simulators 
2. Higher-Order Models 
3. Live ranges and operational platforms 
Previously Stand-alone simulators model the battlefield at the 
vehicle level. The differences in the simulator is in the 
Computer Image Generator (CIG), the terrain map and how it 
manages automated entities. Interoperability involves mapping 
simulator events and state into the DIS protocol and generating 
an accurate terrain data base for the simulation assets. 
The Higher-Order models are interfaced through a Computer 
Generated Forces system. One of the benefits of translating these 
HOM's to DIS is the Plan View Display and Stealth capability of 
DIS. 
The simulation assets of a DIS system can be used to provide 
range participants with the infrastructure of a larger 
battlefield than that possible using field equipment at the 
range. Interoperability involves mapping the state of a Range 
Control Center, the location and velocity information and events 
from the various platforms. An accurate terrain database of the 
range is needed for the simulation assets. One trade-off to be 
considered in translating the range protocol into DIS is the ease 
with which entities can join and leave the exercise. A reduced 
sized entity state PDU can be used for the instrumentation 
service network. However, simulation management must establish 
the appropriate databases when an entity joins. 





Interoperability that the DIS initiative is attempting requires 
that interactive operations be achieved at each site, consulting 
a standard document, and without communicating with each site. 
Such interoperability requires that the interface of each 
simulator to the network be specified down to the hardware plug. 





















strict interoperability requires that the standard take care 
of all technical aspects of linking together parts of the 
network. Only administrative details are left to be negotiated by 
the participants and the network. 
Much progress has been made over the past decade on 
standardizing approaches to interconnecting computer systems. 
Three aspects of distributed interactive simulation distinguish 
DIS from the more general computer/communication interconnection. 
These are: 1) real time delivery requirements for interactive, 
man-in-the loop behavior 2) multicast delivery options for 
convenient updating of shared data items and 3) military security 
considerations. The approach to interoperability specified in 
this standard is to adopt the more general communication 
framework, augmenting it only as necessary to meet the specific 
additional requirements of distributed interactive simulation. 
Any approach taken toward communication interoperability 
must apply to as wide a variety of existing simulators as 
possible, preferably all. This interoperability integration 
shall be possible with minimal disruption of existing simulators, 
even at the expense of optimality and efficiency. To accomplish 
this for the widest class of existing simulators, including those 
already interconnected and those running stand alone, only the 
minimum properties should be standardized to accomplish the 
integration. This allows as many pre-existing configurations as 
possible to remain compliant with the minimum change, as well as 
accommodating the maximum flexibility for future innovation with 
minimum disruption to working systems. 
There are many approaches to integrating a simulator into an 
integrated DIS exercise which fit within the framework outlined 
above. From an architectural point of view, the following list 
enumerates a variety of possible simulator organizations, all of 
which are appropriate for meeting DIS interoperability 
requirements: 
a simulator and its DIS communication interface can coexist 
on a single host computer. 
a single host can run multiple simUlations, using the same 
or different DIS host identities for these entities. 
a dedicated front end processor can be used for implementing 
the communication interoperability (as well as other DIS) 
requirements for one or more back end simulators. This 
approach is sometimes referred to as an "application 
gateway". One of the primary advantages to this approach is 
minimal interference with currently operational simulators. 
The interconnection of the application gateway with the 
simulator is not subject to the DIS standardization effort. 





















useable by various classes of simulators. 
a simulation implementation can span multiple computers, 
either as part of a multiprocessor system, locally 
distributed, or even with geographically distributed 
components. with ' such arrangements, from the vantage point 
of the network, a single component is designated as 
representing the simulation in its entirety. Any 
information distribution among the components is entirely 
the responsibility of the simulator. 
3.2 Protocol suites 
3.2.1 Role of the Communication Architecture. 
The ISO Reference Model is probably the most widely referenced 
model for communication architecture, and we adopt its use here. 
Under this model, the communication interconnection problem is 
broken down into seven layers, each with specific responsibility 
in carrying out part of the overall communication integration. 
The development of this reference model was in large measure 
motivated by and patterned after the success of the DARPA 
Internet program, which was the pioneer of the general machine 
interconnection technology base. Along with the development of 
the reference model, ISO has developed a series of protocols 
which in some cases mirror comparable entities in the Internet, 
and in other cases extend and formalize concepts only primitively 
developed by the Internet program. Currently, there are two 
dominant suites of protocols (Internet and ISO) which fit within 
the Reference Model communication architecture and are 
instantiations of a solution to the general communication 
interoperability problem. They differ in their details, in their 
maturity, in their number of options, in their flexibility, in 
their performance, in their number of currently available 
commercial products, in their number of fielded systems, and in 
their organizational support, among other factors. 
Within level 3 of this reference model there is functionality 
which is key to a generalized interconnection model. This 
network level provides for packets of information to be 
transparently delivered from system to system across almost 
arbitrary interconnections of local and wide area networks. By 
adopting the low cost conventions of providing for remote 
delivery even when delivery is actually local, and through the 
provision of gateway processors linking the local and wide area 
networks, a single approach (from the application perspective) 
can handle both the local and global cases, as well as 
transparently handle any needed change from one to the other. 
Under this approach, any reasonable selection for the layers 
below will be perfectly acceptable and work. These decisions 
can be handled locally on a case by case basis or by policy over 





















the level three interface admits a mixing and matching approach 
to all of the levels below without sacrificing interoperability. 
Levels above do need to be matched. However, in our immediate 
case, handling interoperability for these functional elements has 
already been subsumed into the current DIS PDU standard. This 
approach ensures the maximum interoperability with the minimum of 
specification and new development. 
3.2.2 Generalized Functional Architecture. 
The Communications community thinks in terms of a vertical 
layering of communications functions. The accepted nomenclature 
(adopted by the International Standards Organization) refers to 
seven layers. Table VIII identifies the levels and illustrates 
their meaning in the context of the networking of simulators. 










Kind of data exchanged (position, 
orientation, ••• ) 
Dead reckoning rules. 
Rules on determining hit or miss and damage. 
Representation of position (local vs 
geocentric coordinates), orientation (Euler 
angles, Quaternions, SPV) , units (English, 
metric, degrees, BAMs •. ), and encoding 
(integer vs float, big vs little endian). 
Procedure for starting and ending an 
exercise. Rules for joining and leaving an 
exercise. 
Freeze. 
Addressing from end user to end user. 
Assuring communications reliability, if 
required. 
Addressing information from node to node. 
Framing of information on a physical link. 
Flags, zero bit insertion. Conflict 
resolution. 
Wire, optical fiber, radio transmission. 






















The DIS PDU document addresses levels 5 through 7. It does so 
without separating the levels. Levels 4 and below are defined in 
the remainder of this section. 
There are a variety of existing protocols and interfaces which 
populate the functional areas for levels 1-4. The two most 
prominent suites of protocols which are collectively put forth as 
solutions to the interoperability problem are the DoD (Internet) 
suite and the OSI (GOSIP) suite. At this stage of evolution, 
the two are conceptually similar, but vary considerably in the 
details and in maturity. Both suites emphasize the network 
transparency from level 3 and above, as discussed previously. 
This means that one simulator is completely isolated from the 
selections made at levels 1 and 2 for every other simulator or 
collection of simulators, by adopting one of the "internetwork" 
layer standards as the base level for interoperability. This 
provides the freedom to delegate to local decision making the 
protocols used for the lower levels (assuming the selections 
conform with overall, real time performance objectives). The 
current real work of this document focuses essentially on levels 
3 and 4. A plan which starts from the more mature Internet suite 
and evolves as appropriate over time toward the GOSIP suite is 
the most prudent path at this time. 
3.2.3 OSI Compatibility. 
The ISORM was developed in 1977 by the International Organization 
for Standardization in response to the need to interconnect 
heterogeneous computers. OSI defines a framework for the 
interaction of users and applications in a distributed 
environment. 
The Government Open Systems Interconnection Profile is the u.S. 
Government program for adoption of OSI across all Federal 
agencies. The purpose of GOSIP is to provide: networking 
connectivity, through GOSIP network architecture; 
interoperability, through standard "profiles" of OSI protocols; 
and competition, through focus on small number of subnetwork 
technologies and interoperable applications. 
3.2.3.1 Benefits of DIS Compliance to the OSI/GOSIP 
Architecture. 
DIS compliance with the OSI/GOSIP architecture provides the 
following benefits: reduced cost, increased interoperability, and 
increased application-level functionality. Efforts to ensure 
conformance to OSI/GOSIP standards and ensure interoperability 
between products of different vendors means that computer 
networking can be done as an integration of multi-vendor, 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components. Easy access to 
vendor interoperable COTS OSI/GOSIP products gives wider 





















Not only will OSI/GOSIP standards provide interoperability 
between products, but international interoperability will also be 
increased. The OSI standards are international in scope and will 
be used by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, 
among others. Using OSI standards opens the possibility that 
interoperation with our NATO allies will be accomplished within 
the framework of international standards. 
3.2.4 PDU Encapsulation for Phase O. 
For the 1992 Interservice/Industry Training Systems Conference 
(I/ITSC), a demonstration of the use of DIS will occur. This 
demo will use the UDP/IP protocols for the communication 
architecture. The encapsulation of PDU in the UDP header was 
defined for the demonstration as shown below. 
+-----------------------------------------------+ 
I IP I UDP I Data I I I I I +-----------------------------------------------+ 
The UDP fields are defined as: 
1 - source port 
2 - destination 
port 
3 - length 
4 - checksum 





An optional field, when 
meaningful, indicates the 
port of the sending 
process. 
[DIS = 3000] 
Length of the datagram 
including the header and 
data. 
verifies part of the IP 
header, the entire UDP 
header and data 
DIS PDU data 
Commonly used source and destination port numbers are available 




There are a number of factors which have a major influence on DIS 















Total number of entities 
Mixture of entity types. 
Type of exercise or scenario 
Choice of dead reckoning algorithm (and 
positional/angular thresholds) 
security requirements 
For the current set of approved DIS PDUs, the majority of network 
traffic will be Entity state PDUs (ESPDUs). ESPDUs are required 
to be sent at some minimum rate (e.g. every 5 seconds) by every 
entity and may be sent much more frequently depending on entity 
dynamics. The start-up of a session will also see high traffic 
but that is deterministic. The PDUs used to initialize an 
exercise or entity (such as the recommended Activate PDUs) 
represent a significant amount of data to be sent via the net, 
but they can be transmitted at a controlled rate. In the near 
term, the inclusion of Emitter PDUs may add a significant traffic 
load to the network, depending on the degree of electronic 
warfare (EW) present in a given exercise. Similarly the future 
inclusion of simulated tactical communication links (both voice 
and data) will undoubtedly have a substantial impact on 
bandwidth. 
In addition to the above there are also additional bandwidth 
requirements due to communications "overhead". A given PDU of 
"n" bits in length requires the addition of both headers and 
trailers in order to satisfy routing and data integrity 
requirements. The proposed UDP/IP protocols add 28 octets (8 for 
UDP and 20 for IP). The underlying media adds further overhead, 
such as FDDI's 20 to 28 octets of preamble, header and trailer 
information. A method to reduce this load is to concatenate PDUs 
at the application layer such that the overhead bits are applied 
to groups of PDUs rather than to every PDU. This approach, 
however, imposes an additional computational load on each host. 
This trade-off of processing load vs network traffic requires 
further study before serious recommendations can be made. 
Another source of "overhead" traffic are security measures. The 
degree of overhead depends on at what layer (of the OSI seven 
layer stack) the security measures are implemented. 






In general, there is no single set of formulae for accurately 
estimating the bandwidth requirements of any given DIS exercise 
since, by nature, they have a combination of man-in-the-loop and 
non-deterministic simulated adversaries. As such, each entity in 
a given exercise generates network traffic at a varying rate. 
The rate varies depending on the particular involvement of that 
entity with others. For example any vehicle that is in transit 
to or from its assigned duty area will exhibit very predictable 





















an entity entering into conflict or close cooperation with 
another will typically generate a high level of traffic. In both 
cases the traffic is a result of the frequency at which the POUs 
are generated, while the size of the individual POUs remain 
relatively stable. Estimating sizes of POUs for selected entity 
types is a comparatively straightforward process while estimating 
the frequency at which they are generated is fairly complex and 
more subjective. 
As stated earlier the Entity state POU will be the main source of 
network traffic. There are currently nine other POU types 
required by the DIS standard, with several others recommended. 
Of the nine required, six are related to logistics (e.g. repair 
and resupply) and are expected to occur so infrequently as to 
have little or no effect on network bandwidth requirements. 
Another, the Collision POU, also falls into this category. The 
remaining two are the Fire POU (FPOU) and Detonation POU (OPOU), 
and conceivably can occur frequently enough at certain stages of 
battle to be considered in bandwidth calculations. In addition, 
the Emitter POU (EPOU), one of the emerging recommended messages, 
is likely to be a major contributor in the near future. These 
four POU types have the following formula for determining their 
sizes (in bits): ' 
PDU FORMULA REMARKS 
ESPDU 1152+128A where A= # of articulated part 
FPDU 704 records 
DPDU 800+128H H= # of articulated parts 
hit 
EPDU 192+E(160+B(304+96T» E= # of emitters 
B= # of beams per emitter 
T= # of targets per beam 
Given the above, it is possible to estimate the POU sizes for 
classes of entity types. For example, for a given type of tank 
the minimum number of articulated part records may be 5 (azimuth 
and azimuth rate for turret, elevation of the barrel, and up/down 
position for two hatches) and the number of emitters 1 (laser 
range finder). For a fighter aircraft the number of articulated 
parts could easily be 20 (8 weapon stations, 2 drop tank 
stations, 6 vertical control surfaces, 2 horizontal control 
surfaces, landing gear~ and speed brake) with 3 emitters (radar, 
jammer, and laser designator). Similar assumptions can be made 
regarding surface ships. The following table presents estimates 






















TABLE VI. PDU Sizing Estimates 
ENTITY CLASS A H E ~ ~ ESPDUFPDU DPDU EPDU 
TANK 5 1 1 1 1 1792 704 928 752 
AIRCRAFT 20 2 3 1 2 3712 704 1056 2160 
SURFACE SHIP 50 5 10 1 5 7552 704 1440 9632 
The next step in estimating the bandwidth requirements of a given 
exercise is to approximate the rates at which each entity class 
will issue each of the above PDU types. Since this rate can vary 
a great deal within a given exercise, one method of estimation is 
to give values representing some average low and high rates. The 
final step is to determine the number of each major entity type 
which will participate in the exercise. Given all of these 
factors, the determination of a range of probable network traffic 
can be easily calculated. Figure 7 presents an example of such 
an analysis for three different types of exercises. The examples 
include tactical voice and data links as sources of network 
traffic (65 Kbs for each voice channel and actual values for 
Link-4A, Link-II, and Link-16). Figure 8 presents the results of 
the same analysis in graphical format. 
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As shown in the figures, the network traffic can vary as 
much as ten to one depending on the relative number of entities 
which are in a high dynamic environment. The low end of the 
charts are certainly the minimum bandwidth requirements since 
they are based on all entities in a quiescent mode (i.e. ESPDUs 
only once every 5 seconds). The high ends of the charts are more 
subjective since it makes assumptions as to the maximum rates 
each entity type will exhibit, but in any case are not probable 
since they represent all entities simultaneously engaged in heavy 
combat. Given those assumptions, such charts may be used as a 
guide to sizing a network for any type of exercise. 




The sample bandwidth values shown are only for 
illustration, and should not be used in formal 
specifications. 
The Emitter PDU used here is in accordance with the 
latest format proposed by the Emissions Subgroup, not 
the format shown in the existing version of the DIS 
specification. This latest version results in less 
overall network traffic since it is only issued on 
change of the emitter data (the older version had to be 
issued at least as often as ESPDUs). 
The analysis does not account for the transitory 
existence of entities in the form of guided weapons 
released by various types of weapon systems. These 
will add still further traffic and will most likely be 
present during the same period of time where high 
vehicle dynamics are also occurring - during engagement 
of groups of opposing forces. 
No data compression is assumed. For reduction of PDU 
traffic it is not considered viable at this time due to 
the large computational load it would place upon each 
entity host computer. It should be seriously 
considered for tactical voice links, however, since the 
task is simplified by the fact that the computer does 
not need to know what is actually in a voice message; 
the compression and decompression can then be done by 
hardware, external to the computer system. The signal 
can be compressed by hardware at the source, sent over 
the network in its compressed form, and fed directly to 
decompression hardware at the listener. A variety of 
commercial devices currently exist to support this, 
some offering time stamping of the audio stream for 
synchronization. Standards are emerging with the 
growth of multimedia computing technology, and could be 






















4.1. 2 Estimating Traffic in terms of PDUs and Packets per 
Second. 
Once it has been established that the underlying media is capable 
of handling network traffic (i.e. from the bits per second 
standpoint), the next figure of merit to analyze is that of the 
number of messages to be handled in a given unit of time. This 
factor provides a relative figure-of-merit for the type of 
processing power necessary for a given set of communications 
protocols. 
Figure 9 presents another look at the sample exercise data 
presented earlier. Here, in addition to the total traffic for 
each exercise in bits per second there are two additional fields 
showing the number of PDUs per second as well as packets per 






Packet length is the standard 1500 octet Ethernet 
datagram size. 
PDUs can be concatenated such that each packet contains 
several PDUs. The PDU sizes here are taken to be 
without overhead bits; a single set of overhead bits is 
applied to the entire packet. 
The "host" composing the packets always waits until the 
1500 octet limit is filled. In actual practice the 
efficiency factor will probably be lower (to avoid 
excessive latency), resulting in an actual packet rate 
that falls somewhere between the two values (PDUs/sec 
and packets/sec) shown. 
Voice packets are produced at 32 Hz, Link-II and Link-
4A at 4 Hz, and Link-16 (JTIDS) at 16 Hz. 
46 
-------------------
SAMPLB PDU SIZlNG 
·E7:;rg':A'·T':::'::::,:';:=:n:'::::1J.· I ::(::::j:;:·;:::·:::::·:'nt :::::B·' I :.·:::f@:;f:mI;~t'R:::l n:;:t@t::;:::1'';@IX: J ::=tesPDt1.w·::,:;::,ttFPJJttt:t::f:\::::rneQu::m8' 1:!::mmr::);fSlJPu:rt:;::·r· 
TANK:t:::::::=::::::i,:t::;;:I::;:t'1l;1::::I::t::!::::I:::::rg· I 5 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 2220 I 1132 I 1356 I 1180 
ATRGRAF1t::::tfmI::::';::::fcmn:::::::w::tn 20 I 2 I 3 I 1 I 2 I 4140 I 1132 I 1484 I 2588 
SUJ:{PAcg:$Jfflks:::;::r::;:tr:;:,.Jttii=:\ 1 50 I 5 I 10 I 1 I 5 I 7552 I 1132 I 1868 I 10060 





SAMPLE RA TES PER ENTITY TYPE PER PDU TYPE 
p.·lv·RA't6;.7@::;:;:~;mt}::nm)::;i\.':;::C:M:}:.' ·{!::::rm;mmtt@1ItaUJUTS 









SAMPLE EXERCISE TRAFFIC ESTIMATES 











































Some interactions between simulated entities are very tightly 
coupled in time. That is, the action of an individual 
controlling one of the entities may be a reaction to the activity 
of another. How tightly these interactions are coupled in time 
depends on the performance of the unit being controlled. High 
performance units, that is those units that react quickly to a 
human controllers input, tend to be very tightly coupled. An 
example of this is one simulated fighter aircraft flying in close 
formation with another. Units that respond to control inputs 
less quickly, such as ships, are only loosely coupled. 
The issue of communications latency is directly related to how 
tightly a simulated entity is coupled to the entity to which it 
is reacting. The more tightly coupled two simulated entities 
are, the less latency is permitted in the communications that 
carry the state data of each to the other. Allowable latency 
under different circumstances is the subject of considerable 
debate. Little research of the quality that can serve as the 
basis of standards for latency has been done. The best 
information available is from the flight simulator industry, 
which for many years has been struggling with a related issue 




Humans cannot distinguish differences in time that are less 
than 100 milliseconds. This is due to physiological factors 
of the human body. This effectively provides a floor 
latency/transport delay value. That is, with a human in the 
control loop, there is no benefit to be gained from 
latency/transport delay less than 100 milliseconds. 
In situations where latency/transport delay reaches 300 
milliseconds, pilots start compensating for the lag in 
response. The result is a phenomenon known as pilot Induced 
Oscillation (PIO). Such PIO can range from a minor 
annoyance to total loss of control. 
The flight simUlation community has also experimented with 
schemes to compensate for transport delay by predicting the 
behavior of the device being controlled. This approach showed 
promise, but the main emphasis in dealing with transport delay 
has been in reducing the delay by faster processing and better 
communications within the simulator. The DIS community has also 
begun to explore prediction of position as a means to compensate 
for latency in tightly coupled interaction. Northrop has done 






















community2 suggest that sophisticated prediction algorithms can 
compensate for up to 750 milliseconds of latency in the 
interaction of high performance aircraft carrying out radical 
maneuvers. 
The position of simulated vehicles is not the only consideration 
in dealing with latency. DIS networks will also carry voice in 
the simulation of tactical radio nets. A speaker's voice will be 
converted from analog to a digital data stream that will be 
treated as just another series of PDUs. At the listener's 
position these will be converted back into analog form and will 
be output to speakers and/or headphones. Latency in such voice 
communications carries its own considerations. 
In the case of an overseas phone call that was routed via a 
geosynchronous satellite, latency of a half second or more is 
inherent in such communication. In normal conversation this is 
annoying but the speakers can generally adjust to it without 
difficulty. However, in the heat of a simulated operation such 
delays would render a simulated radio net unusable and would not 
be acceptable. Also, there is no prediction mechanism that can 
compensate for delays in voice traffic. 
The dispersion of the arrival times of voice PDUs is also 
important. In the process of converting analog voice to a 
digital data stream, the analog signal is sampled at regular 
intervals and each sample is converted to a digital message. For 
the reconstruction of the voice back to analog these messages 
should ideally arrive at the same regular interval. However, due 
to a variety of factors, there will some dispersion of arrival 
times. If the dispersion is too great, voice quality will suffer 
and may be unintelligible. The mechanism of converting voice 
from digital to analog form can handle some dispersion in arrival 
times. It is also possible to deliberately hold incoming voice 
PDUs in an accumulating FIFO buffer and then meter them to the 
voice reconstruction mechanism at a same rate at which the voice 
was sampled. This technique would eliminate the effects of delay 
dispersion, but would do so at the cost of additional overall 
latency. 
4.2.1 Allocation of Latency Values. 
In designing systems that meet the total latency standards 
defined in the CADIS standard, it is important to allocate these 
latencies in a reasonable manner. For example, in a LAN if one 
designs a simulator with a latency of 45 milliseconds between the 
2 Position paper "Techniques for Extrapolation, Delay Compensation, and 
Smoothing with Preliminary Results and an Evaluation Tool," S. Goel, K. 
Morris, IST-CR-91-13, Summary Report: The Fifth Workshop on Standards for the 





















application layer and the media (layer 1) it will still meet the 
standard of 100 milliseconds for total latency with similar 
simulators on the same LAN. However, if it becomes part of an 
exercise that includes simulators from other geographic sites, 
the total latency will likely exceed 100 milliseconds due to the 
latency consumed by the WAN connecting the sites. 
5. SECURITY 
5.1 Introduction. 
The goal of this section is to identify a number of security 
requirements made evident by the broad outlines of DIS, and by 
common understanding regarding the environment in which DIS will 
perform. The section will also give a thumbnail sketch of the 
world of information security. This section is not intended to 
be a comprehensive analysis of DIS security requirements. Such 
requirements will be a complex function of the system itself as 
it evolves, and of the needs of its primary intended users. 
5.2 Policy. 
As an Automated Information Systems (AIS), networks supporting 
DIS must comply with appropriate security criteria to be 
certified and accredited to process unclassified sensitive and 
classified information. The criteria encompass a wide range of 
security issues that impact the AIS or network. Security is 
usually achieved by a combination of software and hardware 
functions, administrative procedures, personnel clearances, and 
physical measures. The Designated Approving Authority (DAA) 
determines the required balance of automated functions and manual 
procedures in accordance with risk management decisions. 
AIS security is an operational requirement and requires detailed 
planning and execution to a degree equal to or grater than any 
other operational requirement. Security shall be considered 
throughout the life cycle of an AIS of network from the beginning 
of concept development, though design, development, operation, 
and maintenance. The program manager and system developer must 
take steps to ensure that security considerations are addressed 
in each of the above referenced phases of the system life cycle. 
5.2.1 Security Plan. 
security Plans for DIS networks will be based on guidance from 
appropriate DoD Component Heads. Security plans shall be 
prepared by the appropriate Information System Security 
organization (ISSO) or Network Security Officer (NSO) 
5.3 security Vocabulary. 

















specification for DIS is the acceptance of a common vocabulary 
for discussing security issues. The most widely accepted system 
so far developed is the DoD Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation 
criteria (TCSEC), and its follow on "interpretations" for 
Networking, Secure Database Standards, and Integrity criteria. 
TCSEC is also known as the Orange Book, while the Trusted Network 
Interpretation (TNI) is known as the Red Book. These works have 
both popularized and made explicit such terms as "Security 
Policy", "Multilevel Security", "Discretionary Access Control", 
"Trusted Path", etc., as well as the familiar rating categories 
C1, C2, B1, B2, B3, A1. 
The National Computer Security center (NCSC) evaluates commercial 
products. 
There are many good reasons for using the DoD security 
vocabulary. For one thing, it is fairly explicit, and addresses, 
in one form or another, virtually every conceivable aspect of 
computer security. It is not necessary to commit to the 
evaluation categories, or to specific formulas of risk 
assessment, to benefit from the vocabulary, concepts, and 
methodologies which have been developed. In addition, the 
primary clients for DIS will, at least initially, come from the 
DoD, and the classified nature of information exchanged on 
distributed simulation nets makes the DoD approach appropriate. 
5.4 DIS Security Requirements. 
A comprehensive list of DIS security requirements is not 
available, nor is there one in preparation. Yet certain specific 
security needs are already discernible. It is the responsibility 
of the network sponsor to describe the overall network security 
policy enforced by the Network Trusted computing Base (NTCB). At 
a minimum, this policy shall include the discretionary and 
mandatory integrity, or both. The policy may require data 
secrecy, or data integrity, or both. It is essential that 
development of the discretionary and mandatory secrecy policy be 
addressed as an integral part of network design. Some of the 
elements that support the security policy are described briefly 
in the remainder of this section. The elements are merely 
examples, development of a security policy and security appliques 
for specific DIS application requires support from information 
security specialist within a given organization or command and 
may also require support from INFOSEC specialist from the 
National Security Agency's (NSA) Information Systems Security 
Organization. 
I 5.4.1 Encryption 
5.4.1.1 Confidentiality Requirements. 























will contain sensitive data regarding weapons systems 
characteristics and warfare tactics. A DIS exercise may also be 
the rehearsal of an operational mission, and as such the data 
exchanged will be extremely sensitive. Clearly such information 
must be protected from eavesdropping by simulation 
non-participants, much in the same manner as telemetry data is 
protected. Eavesdropping can occur via wiretapping, which is 
monitoring by entities not legitimately connected to the net, or 
by users who are legitimately connected but are accessing message 
data not intended or them. 
A mechanism for thwarting eavesdroppers is encryption of messages 
on the network. The architectural level at which 
encryption/decryption occurs is significant: encryption at the 
link level (L2) is more efficient, while encryption at the 
session layer or higher (L5+) allows users to be differentiated 
by different encryption keys, and protects messages for a greater 
part of their passage through the operating system of the host. 
Encryption is used for other tasks as well, in particular the 
authentication of user identities Identification and 
authentication are covered in section 5.4.3 below). 
5.4.1.2 Key Distribution. 
Assigning and distributing cryptographic keys on a dynamic or 
per-session basis can be a major difficulty. However, the Joint 
Chiefs Of Staff (JCS) issued a Multicommand Required Operational 
Capability (MROC) for a Joint Key Management System (JKMS) on 28 
December 1989. Further, the criticality of interoperability 
through electronic key distribution was underscored by joint 
operations in DESERT STORM, and consequently enjoys a high 
priority. When fielded, electronic key management will eliminate 
the requirement to physically deliver keying material to each DIS 
facility. Products such as CANEWARE and NEW are already capable 
of accepting electronically distributed key. 
5.4.1.3 DIS Encryption. 
Nodes on a DIS network will not transmit a great deal of data, 
but will receive data from all the other nodes in the simulation. 
Thus a fast algorithm is required, if only on the decoding end. 
Fiber Data Distribution Interface (FDDI) fiber optics are 
relatively safe from wiretapping, so the need for encryption on a 
FDDI ring is reduced on a LAN if its configuration meets the 
criteria of a protected distribution system (PDS). On a LAN 
supporting multilevel security, encryption may be required to 
prevent eavesdropping by legitimately connected FDDI hosts; 
likewise there is an eventual need for session level isolation 
and access control in multi-user application gateways. Wide Area 
Networks (WAN) employing FDDI will require encryption due to the 










plus data rates are under development but not currently 
available. Fortunately, in the short term, only single 
simulations will run on the DIS net, and nonparticipants can be 
physically excluded; thus link level encryption for FOOl can 
await the emergence of a suitably fast technology. 
5.4.2 Access Control Issues. 
DIS will support multiple simulations simultaneously on a single 
network. Enforcing the separation of simulations becomes ~ 
security issue when differing classification levels coexist, as, 
for example, when a highly classified weapons development 
simulation is run together with a simulated battle scenario, 
presumably at a lower classification level. 
DIS security issues go far beyond the protection of run-time 
simulation messages. computers that participate in more than one 
level of exercise will be required to store and to internally 
manipulate data of varying classifications, and to insure that 
only users with proper clearance can access classified data. 
This raises issues of Multilevel Security at both the Operating 
System and Database levels. The following sections discuss 
these issues in more detail. 











Label-based security is an important requirement in the 000 TCSEC 
at the B1 and higher levels of assurance. The mechanisms are 
called Mandatory Access Controls (MAC) because data transfer is 
governed, in part, by the contents of subject and object 
sensitivity labels. 
Multilevel security is implemented by defining a class of 
protected data objects, and attaching security sensitivity labels 
to them. Autonomous entities (users and processes) are known as 
sUbjects; these also receive sensitivity labels by which their 
access to the protected objects is regulated. The set of 
subjects and objects, together with the rules for access, is 
carefully specified in a set of rules. The enforcement mechanism 
for the rules is referred to as the Reference Monitor. 
The Bell-Lapadula Model is a Security Policy associated with the 
TCSEC. It specifies important read and write controls so that 
classified information cannot flow in violation of national 
security directives. The Bell-LaPadula model is the most widely 
accepted and implemented access control model used in the 000. 
5.4.3 Identity and Authentication. 
In a distributed interactive simulation, it is important to 
guarantee that participants are, in fact, who they say they are; 





















entities can occur at varying levels of granularity: the level of 
host on a network, the level of human users on the network, or 
the identifications of individual processes. In the initial DIS 
environment, simulation hosts will participate in only one 
simulation at a time; it seems reasonable, therefore, to 
initially propose a per-node granularity of authentication. 
5.4.4 Integrity. 
In DIS, as in most environments, there is the need to insure that 
data is not corrupted, either deliberately or by accident. This 
issue of Integrity is an important security problem, and applies 
to message data, stored information, and dynamically manipulated 
information within an operating system. Again, cryptography 
plays an important role in data integrity verification (for 
example by checksums), and many network authentication services 
also support point-to-point integrity pOlicies. 
5.4.5 Audit. 
A critical facility for all secure systems, including networks, 
is the audit facility. The audit facility maintains logs of 
security-relevant events in tamperproof, restricted access 
locations; typical examples of logged events include attempted 
logins and access to critical data. Commercial audit products 
exist. 
Audit trails can be maintained on individual systems, but a 
network audit facility is also desirable in DIS. Coordinating a 
distributed audit facility can be a problem, and might require 
utilities like NFS and yellow pages (secure versions of which are 
currently under development). The main problem with audit is 
storing and analyzing the enormous amount of data that can be 
generated. The primary approach to this problem is to specify a 
limited set of audit events; this greatly reduces the data 
volume. Many audit systems will have built in "triggers", or 
thresholds, that expand the level of audit detail in areas where 
certain conditions have been exceeded. Likewise, there are 
processing tools to make the analysis of audit data easier, 
should that prove necessary. 
5.4.6 Security Architecture. 
Approaches to network security are dictated by a number of 
factors such as data rates, vulnerability, threat and 
availability of encryption devises. The DIS Security Models 
section describes a security framework and security architectures 
that are usable and compatible with the DIS architecture. 
5.4.7 Physical Security. 





















"physical" mechanisms, i.e., those that are not part of the 
computer operating system. A list of examples might include: 
1) Protected cables, locked rooms, security guards, removable 
media 
2) Computer locks, disk drive locks, hardening against 
radiation leakage & radiation damage 
Physical security can come from unexpected sources, for example 
fiber-optic networks, which almost as a bonus provide several 
measures of physical security. Fiber optic networks 1) are 
difficult to tap undetected, 2) immune to EMR damage, and 3) do 
not leak EMR that can be monitored. 
In general, however, the methods of physical security lie outside 
our scope of interest. 
5.5 Security Products. 
A list of certified network products can be found in the 
Information Systems Security Products and Services Catalogue, 
published by the NSA. Additional information in Information 
Systems Security products and services may be obtained by writing 
to: 
Director 
National Security Agency 
ATTN: INFOSEC Office of customer Relations 
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 
or calling: 
customer Relations at (301)688-4680. 
5.6 DIS Security Models (to be added) 
5.6.1 Case 1: Single Cell - System High 
5.6.2 Case 2: Multiple Cells - Same Security Level 
5.6.3 Case 3: Multiple Cells - Different Security Levels 
5.7 Conclusion. 
The security situation for DIS is complicated by the desire for 
standards and interoperability, a real dearth of available 
products, and the inherent vulnerabilities of a distributed 
architecture. Implementors of critical features, such as 
networking, operating systems, and database security will have to 
confront major systems integration and standards-conformance 





















DIS must operate will make adherence to formal standards of 
evaluation and certification more critical than in commercial 
environments. 
6. NETWORK MANAGEMENT 
6.1 Network Management. 
The approach to network management is usually dependent upon the 
type of network employed. Thus, there is a generally recognized 
and sanctioned way to manage an OSI based network, in the form of 
OSI network management protocols and service definitions. 
Similarly, an Internet based network is typically managed by 
Internet network management protocols. The most prudent course 
of action would be to adopt the network management approach that 
comes with the protocol suite selected for handling 
interoperability. 
6.1.1 Basic Functions. 
Exercise communications management is a set of facilities to 
monitor and control the networks that join simulators and other 
DIS components at a site and sites with each other. Monitoring 
shall mean the ability to determine the status of a network 
component. Control shall mean the ability to set parameters of a 
network component. The monitoring and control of network 
components is often referred to as "network management". 
DIS requirements for network management are essentially the same 
as for any other distributed application. One can think of an 
exercise as having two phases, initialization and operation. 
During the initialization phase, one would use network management 
monitoring facilities to check the status of lines, host 
interfaces, routers, and other network components required for 
the exercise. Control functions would be used to boot devices 
with the appropriate parameters, enable interfaces, and so on. 
The exact set of functions used would depend on the equipment 
being used, the extent to which its configuration can be changed, 
and the nature of the network or networks involved. 
During operation of an exercise, network management functions 
would be used to detect and troubleshoot problems. Monitoring 
functions are used to detect apparent connectivity or equipment 
failures. Once a problem is detected, operators select 
appropriate monitoring functions to retrieve parameter values or 
other information needed to determine the exact cause. Finally, 
operators can use control functions to reboot equipment, activate 
alternate interfaces, or take other corrective action. As is the 
case for initialization, the exact functions used would depend on 






















It should be noted that some facets of network operation are not 
typically automated or performed remotely. For example, a 
network operator might command the use of a dial-up line, but the 
use of leased lines must typically be arranged for in advance. 
Also, while a network operator might command the use of back-up 
equipment when primary equipment fails, it is sometimes necessary 
for a technician to remove and replace failed components. 
6.1.2 Network Management Architecture 
DIS shall use standard network management protocols to manage the 
communications infrastructure. simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP) is a network management protocol frequently used 
in conjunction with the Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP) stack. Common Management 
Information services (CMIS)/Common Management Information 
Protocol (CMIP) is used in an OSI environment. The choice of 
network management protocol would depend on the other protocol 
suites (i.e. Internet or OSI) being used in the network. 
with the phased migration from UDP/IP to OSI recommended by CASS, 
the choice of Network Management protocol would intuitively 
progress from SNMP to CMIS/CMIP. Some of the respective 
architectural features are listed below. 
In the SNMP architecture, there are a number of Network 
Management stations (NMS's) which gather pertinent information by 
communicating with Management Agents associated with each Network 
Element such as hosts, terminal servers, and gateways. 
SNMP's support seems to be widespread and growing. There are, 
however, some perceived limitations 
1. Poor communications between SNMP Network Management 
stations. 
2. There are security weaknesses, such as the lack of 
authentication of Set commands. 
3. SNMP does not handle sub-element addressing. For example, 
to get at info about port #5 of a multi-port router, the net 
manager must go through a long process of repeatedly 
querying data for every instance of a variable 
Work is currently ongoing to correct these problems. A proposa' 
to help resolve this problem will include block transfers of MIB 
data. The proposed revision will be called SMP. 
Problems which must be addressed are information hiding; for 
security reasons, for example, not all network management systems 





















CMIP, like OSI in general, is not widely supported and, in fact, 
not totally proven. One criticism is that it uses all 7 layers of 
the OSI stack and consumes too much processing power. To cut the 
processing requirement, CMOP and CMOL operate over TCP/IP and 
link level respectively. These protocols are not necessarily 
OSI-compliant and are not widely supported. On the positive 
side, SNMP will run over OSI networks. 
6.2 Network Management Functions 
The following sections are functions that should be provided by 
Network Management. Concern was given that these functions will 
all be impacted by the decision on whether security is managed on 
a "cell" basis where all physical simulators and simulators are 
statically bound, or managed based on a conceptual "exercise". 
6.2.1 Define or choose mechanism to promulgate security level of 
exercise. 
Issues for this function are: 
1. What is the system's security lattice, i.e., what are the 
values of the security sensitivity labels that could legally 
be associated with any data in the exercise, and what are 
the dominance relationships when comparing any two with each 
other? 
2. What is the granularity of security sensitivity labeling? 
6.2.2 Define the mapping between classified and unclassified 
databases. 
Issues for this function are: 
1. What is the granularity of security sensitivity labeling 
of the database, e.g., none; table-level; row-level; 
record-level? 
2. Who is to have access to the classified and unclassified 
tables? 
3. What are the clearance levels of those who are to have 
access to the tables? 
6.2.3 Enumerate all hosts participating in the exercise. 
Issues for this function are: 





















2. What is the security lattice subset supported by the 
host? 
3. What are the security characteristics associated with 
hosts with which any given host wishes to communicate? 
6.2.3.1 Enumerate security sensitivity level of all 
participating hosts (in the exercise). 
6.2.4 Provide a mechanism to select & distribute keying material 
as needed. 
security issues for this function are: 
1. Centralized or distributed? 
2. Manual or automated? 
3. If automated, accredited? 
4. What is the security policy regarding key distribution 
and change? 
6.2.5 Choose address or addresses to be used in exercise 
Should the security characteristics (security operating mode, 
maximum security level) of an addressee be supplied with the 
address? 
6.2.6 Allocate bandwidth appropriately 
The philosophical design permits simulators to come and go during 
an exercise which may last for several days. The following 
issues arise: 
1. What bandwidth is reserved in advance? 
2. How are simulators admitted into an exercise with a high 
degree of confidence that performance will remain 
acceptable? Does the exercise management function include 
mechanisms for honoring or rejecting a request to enter ? 
Are there run-time provisions for sensing cases in which one 
network element is "hogging" the medium? It might be difficult 
to call a break to hunt down such a problem. 
6.2.7 Use network time protocol (NTP) rather than new PDUIS for 
time 
Issues for the following function are: 
1. On a dynamic network such as this, could an NTP-base 






















2. considering the sizable investments at most training 
sites and the fact that PC and VME- based GPS receivers can 
be purchased for $5K, might it be better to sync each site 
to GPS ? If each site has a GPS receiver, should NTP be used 
on the LAN? In a LAN, the time server simply broadcasts 
3. The NTP time stamp uses 64-bit fixed-point timestamp with 
integer in first 32-bits and fraction in next 32 bits. Is 
this appropriate for all the various entities including 
field instrumentation entities ? 
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10 communication Architecture Profile For Phase 0 
The following is one example of how a communications profile 
might set up for a DIS exercise. This communication architecture 
uses the DoD family of protocols is based on IP, with TCP 
(MIL-STD-1778) for reliable communication and UDP for real-time 
communication. 
10.1 Exercise Management. In each simulation site there are 
several simulators and a Local Exercise Manager (LEM) , all 
interconnected by a LAN, to which we refer as "Ethernet", even 
though it may be FDDI or other LANs. 
The LEM is a software module, which does not need dedicated 
hardware, and may be implemented on any of the simulators, for 
example. The LEM is in communication with other LEMs, and in 
particular with the Global Exercise Manager (GEM) for the purpose 
of coordinating the entire exercise. 
After the LEMs agree about the parameters of an exercise 
they communicate them to all the participating simulators, using 
a "session-level" type communication. This setup includes the 
identifications of all the simulators involved in the exercise, 
their roles, the exact presentation schemes to be used, the exact 
geographic database to be used, the maximal bandwidth that each 
simulator is allowed to load on the network, and the 
IP-multicast-addresses (IPMCA) assigned to the entire exercise. 
10.2 communication Setup. The setup communication, between 
the LEM and the simulators is conducted by using Telnet over TCP 
(over IP, over Ethernet). The setup process may use both manual 
and automatic procedures. As a part of the general setup, 
database files (e.g., geographic) are loaded, by using FTP 
(MIL-STD-1780), from designated directories. FTP also operates 
over TCP (over IP, over the Ethernet). The real-time 
communication (e.g., of PDUs) is carried by UDP. These packets 
are encapsulated inside Ethernet packets. The entire 
configuration is managed (and verified) by using SNMP in the 
simulators. This allows a remote network management process to 
check the status of each simulator. 
In each case the real-time simulation messages are sent to 
all the participants in the exercise, local broadcast over the 
Ethernet, and remote multicast over WANs. 
It is expected that future simulators may require time 
synchronization. This may be achieved by using the Internet time 
synchronization protocol (a.k.a. the Network Time Protocol, NTP), 
over UDP, on the Ethernet. The time protocol is defined in 





















The real-time communication for the support of distributed 
interactive simulation requires that a given bandwidth is 
delivered without exceeding a given delay. In practice this 
required both multicast and bandwidth performance guarantees. 
Since these issues (bandwidth+delay and multicast) are at the 
network level (level-3 of the ISORM) it is possible to address 
them at the gateway between the LAN and the WAN. If the WAN 
provide these services there is no need for this gateway to be 
involved. However, in the most general case this gateway should 
handle them. In cases that the Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) 
gateways and WANs do not provide this functionality it can be 
achieved it by adding a front-end to the gateway on a general 
purpose computer, preferably with two Ethernet interfaces to 
allow inserting this front-end "in series" with the gateway. 
To guarantee interoperability each simulator should comply 
with the Host-Requirement, as specified in "Requirements for 
Internet hosts - communication layers" (RFCl122) and in 
"Requirements for Internet hosts - application and support" 
(RFCl123). This would guarantee the "invisible support" as 
required for interoperability (including ARP, re-direct, etc.). 
A good source of information is "Perspective on the Host 
Requirements RFCs" (RFCl127). 
+------------+ +--------+ 
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Figure 10. The Protocol Structure in the Simulators 
Notes: 
* The ISORM level of the Ethernet is 2, of IP is 3, and of TCP 
and UDP is 4. The ISO level of the simulation is 7, and its 
presentation level is 6. 
* The simulation session level, 5, does not show explicitly. 
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